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Abstract
The author starts with the premise that the U.S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement, which was
signed on October 14, 1972, and renegotiated as of December 19, 1972, is unique. Before the
agreement was signed, only about 6 percent of U.S.-Soviet trade was being carried in U.S. bot-
toms, whereas 94 percent was being carried in Soviet bottoms. The author highlights that one
significant achievement of the Agreement was the reciprocal opening to access of forty U.S. ports
and forty Soviet ports by commercial, scientific, and merchant marine training ships of the two na-
tions upon four days advance notive. The selection of ports was based on commercial and national
security considerations, and reciprocity. However, very few of the Soviet ports have unloading
facilities adequate to handle the U.S.-flag vessels, whereas most of the U.S. ports can handle the
Soviet vessels, many of which are smaller than the U.S. ships. Because so few of the Soviet ports
have adequate facilities for large foreign commercial vessels, the congestion in the larger ports,
like Odessa, was aggravated by grain shipments. When it was negotiated in 1972, the Maritime
Agreement was an integral part of a series of far-reaching agreements between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. The author concludes that it is vitally important, both from a strategic and a commercial
point of view, to have a strong, healthy maritime industry. In addition, increased trade with the
Soviet Union may broaden economic interdependence and strengthen political cooperation.
THE U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME AGREEMENT: A NEW
PLAN FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION
The U.S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement, which was signed on
October 14, 1972,1 and renegotiated as of December 29, 1972,2 is
unique. It is the only cargo-sharing agreement the United States has
signed, and the only agreement whose negotiation is charged to the
Commerce Department rather than the Department of State. In fact, one
of the reasons the U.S. negotiating team has been successful in
obtaining such a satisfactory agreement is that it is looked upon as a
straight maritime agreement, not merely one of many different compo-
3
nents.
Before the agreement was signed, only about 6 percent of U.S.-
Soviet trade was being carried in U.S. bottoms, whereas 94 percent was
being carried in Soviet bottoms.4 When the U.S.-Soviet grain deal was
5consumated on July 8, 1972, its success was dependent upon working
out some accommodation with the Soviets on the shipping of the grain.
The Soviets preferred to carry the grain in their own ships, which,
being generally smaller than U.S. ships, had ready access to the grain
at the Great Lakes ports. This pleased the U.S. shippers at or near
those ports. The International Longshoremen's Union, on the other
hand, had been demanding that half of all (government generated) con-
trolled cargo carried between U.S. and Soviet ports be carried on
6U.S. vessels. Since the cost of shipping cargo in U.S. vessels was
over twice the current world market rate, the Soviet Union balked at
7
the one-half in U.S. bottoms stipulation, as did the U.S. State
Department, which opposed excluding third flag carriers. The United
22
23
States and her European allies are on record as generally opposing
8flag discrimination, European leaders because they represent some of
the largest third flag carriers, and the United States mainly to
please her European neighbors. Hence the formula in the U.S.-Soviet
Maritime Agreement, which calls for one-third of the U.S.-Soviet trade
being carried in U.S.-flag vessels, one-third in Soviet-flag vessels,
9
and one-third in third flag vessels, is a new departure for the United
States. The firmly expressed intention that the national flag vessels
of the two countries should each carry equal and substantial (one-
third) shares of the trade between the two nations 1was atightening up
of the originally proposed language of the Agreement, which had merely
called for "good faith efforts" to effectuate this goal.
Port Access
One significant achievement of the Agreement is the reciprocal
opening to access of forty U.S. ports and forty Soviet ports 12 by
commercial, scientific, and merchant marine training ships of the two
nations13 upon four days' advance notive. 14 Although the notice
requirement is longer than the normal twenty-four-hour notice required
15
of non-communist commercial vessels for entry to U.S. ports, it is
much shorter than the fourteen-day advance request requirement which
had been applied to ships entering the ports of either country before,
16
requests which could have been denied. Vessels wishing to enter
ports not listed in the Agreement must still comply with the fourteen-
day prior request provisions.
The selection of ports was based on commercial and national
24
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security considerations, and reciprocity. The ports listed by each
nation were roughly paired as to similar characteristics, such as
seasonal access, deepwater depth, and unloading facilities. There are
many small ports as well as large ones listed.
Very few of the Soviet ports have unloading facilities
adequate to handle the U.S.-flag vessels, whereas most of the U.S.
ports can handle the Soviet vessels, many of which are smaller than
the U.S. ships. This is one reason the U.S. insisted on the same terms
of open access for the scientific, research, and training vessels,
since calls at the specified ports by those ships can help maintain
the U.S. right to reciprocal access. Any vessel deemed to be spying
may be forbidden entry.
Because so few of the Soviet ports have adequate facilities
for large foreign commercial vessels, the congestion in the larger
ports, like Odessa, was aggravated by the grain shipments. Thus the
U.S. was fortunate in having obtained special terms from the Soviets
relating to ship unloading, including a guaranteed rate of cargo dis-
charge of 2,000 metric tons alongside berth, and 3,000 metric tons for
18
lightening operations, and tonnage duties at least $1.75 a ton lower
than the typical rates charged by the Soviets in 1972. 19 Also in the
November 24, 1973 Memorandum on Bulk Cargo Movements, the demurrage
20
rates, which had already been increased, were pegged to a maximum
and a minimum, the minimum being the base for an index.2 1 One method
of reducing unloading time and hence costs is throhgh the use of
LASH-type barges. Provision is made for such use in the 1975
25
Maritime Agreement.22 The U.S. has such vessels, the Soviets do not.
In the 1972 Maritime Agreement, the Soviets guaranteed thirty-
two/thirty-three feet of salt water draft at discharge ports. 23 The
charge to lighten vessels down to this draft was $3.50 per long ton of
cargo lightened.24 The majority of U.S.-flag vessels require more
than thirty-two feet of water and thus have had to pay lighterage
25
charges, even when, as at Odessa, the draft actually was deeper than
the stated maximum for the port, and the ships were allowed to berth
26
without lightening. Thus in the additional memorandum concerning
the 1972 Maritime Agreement, a thrity-four foot draft was guaranteed
in the Black Sea, as were a thirty-two foot fresh water draft in the
27
Baltic, and a thirty foot salt water draft in Nakhodka. In the
November 24, 1973 additional memorandum, the understanding was noted
that vessels should not be charged lightening unnecessarily.
2 8
The 1972 Maritime Agreement maintained the restrictions which
had been placed on ships that had called or would call on a Cuban port
29
after January 1, 1963, or which had called at North Vietnamese or
North Korean ports within 180 days of loading of cargo, or would do so
30
within 120 days. Such vessels could not be bundered at U.S. ports,
nor were they permitted to load or unload in U.S. ports government-
financed cargoes such as grains sold on Commodity Credit Corporation
31
credit terms. Soviet ships which had called in Cuba or Vietnam since
the cutoff dates could still call at U.S. ports and load or. unload
normal commercial cargoes.
In the 1975 Agreement, the restriction on the bunkering of
ships which had called on Cuban ports is not noted, but the above
mentioned bunkering restrictions were placed on ships calling at
ports under the control of South Vietnam and.Cambodia as well as North
Vietnam and North Korea, and vessels "registered in, owned or control-
led by, or under lease or charter to" Cuba, North or South Vietnam,
Cambodia or North Korea, or their nationals, could not be bunkered.
3 2
These restrictions are still in force, even though the State Depart-
ment, on March 17, 1977, lifted the travel ban on Cuba, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and North Korea.
33
Controlled Cargo
The definition of "controlled cargo" in the Agreement is
important.3 4 Only that cargo which is subject to U.S. government
control under the U.S. cargo preference laws is considered-U.S.
controlled cargo. Because of the nature of the Soviet system,
essentially all of their cargo is controlled, and thus must be
included in the total cargoes to be shared.
Equal and Substantial Sharing
Under the 1972 Maritime Agreement, "equal share of the trade"
was measured on the basis of U.S. dollar freight value of cargo
carryings by the respective national-flag carriers during each
calendar year accounting period. The cargoes carried in linear
vessels and bulk cargo vessels were accounted for separately. Under
the 1975 Maritime Agreement, bulk cargoes are measured by the "number
of weight tons of carryings under Charter parties, computed by
general commodity categories" such as grain and ore; whereas the
"accountable liner share" is still computed by "U.S. dollar freight
value of liner carryings of controlled cargo."35 Even though
unavailability of national-flag carriers is certified, the other
party is still obligated to continue to offer the certifying party
later shipments of controlled cargoes to restore the 1/3:1/3 balance
36
if possible during the same calendar year. It is difficult to
compare liner cargoes and bulk cargoes, since there is no common
denominator for "U.S. dollar freight value of liner carryings of
controlled cargo" and "number of weight tons of carryings under
charter parties." Therefore the 1975 Maritime Agreement merely calls
for making adjustments between accounting periods, whereas the 1972
Maritime Agreement called for adjustments between accounting shares
and accounting periods.
37
Freight Rates and Subsidy
Liner freight rates are set under the conference-rate system,
38
and are bolstered by the U.S. operating subsidy program. Bulk
cargo, such as grain, is shipped under charter rates. These rates are
set by the competing shipping lines in the various nations, most of
whom have far lower costs than the U.S. Under the Agreement there are
two categories of bulk rates.
Under the 1972 Maritime Agreement, non-agricultural bulk
cargoes were to be carried at the average freight rate for that cate-
39
gory and route over the prior three calendar years. Under the 1975
Maritime Agreement, dry bulk cargoes in lots of 8,000 long tons or
28
more moving from the Soviet Union to the U.S. are carried at current
market rates.40 The amount of this trade is not significant.
The most important rate fixed under the Agreement is that for
the transport of grain. Originally, the rate under the 1972 Maritime
Agreement was to have been the same as that for non-agricultural bulk
cargoes; the average freight rate over the prior three years for that
category of cargo over the route in question. For wheat and other
heavy grains, that worked out at $8.05 per ton, for the route most
41
expected to be used. However, as a result of the added volume of
business with the Soviet Union, the rates increased sharply after the
preliminary agreement had been reached. Thus, to avoid offering the
Soviets freight rates below the current market rates, the price had to
be renegotiated. The "mutually acceptable rate" agreed upon thus
became the higher of the three-year average described or 110 percent
of the current market rates for such cargo and route.4 2 The 10 per-
cent premium agreed upon was considered an equitable sharing of the
sharp increase in the rates.
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On May 30, 1973, the representatives of the United States and
the Soviet Union agreed to replace the negotiated rate, which had
ranged from $9.00 to $9.40 per long ton of cargo in the U.S. Gulf/
Black Sea trade, plus 10 percent, with an index system based on
monthly average voyage charter rates for the carriage of heavy grains
from the U.S. Gulf to Holland/Belgium.4 4 A British publication, the
Daily Freight Register, was used as the independent authoritative
guide to these rates. The index system was felt to be more flexible
29
and more responsive to rate fluctuations than a periodically fixed
rate. The agreed U.S.-flag rate for the U.S. Gulf/Black Sea route
was set at $16.94 for May of 1973, which put the U.S. in a favorable
position on the index. This index system was used until September 22,
1975, when a new index system with a cumulative adjustment feature
was instituted.45 The. initial rate in the 1975 Maritime Agreement was
the same $16.00 per long ton, with the cumulative adjustment differ-
ential. 46 The rate for 1977 has been fixed at $16.47 a long ton, which
includes a forty-seven cents-a-ton factor to compensate U.S. lines for
cargo they were deprived of in 1975 and 1976. The $16.47 rate will
apply to the first 3.3 million tons of grain shipped in U.S. vessels
this year, which includes 1.2 million tons to compensate the U.S.
lines for not having received their one-third share in 1975 and 1976,
and then will drop to $16.00 a ton.
4 7
The formal pact setting the rates for 1977 could not be
signed until the Soviets reconfirmed the original understanding
between the two countries that "bilateral cargo" included cargo pur-
chased by entities in third countries.48 During part of the 1977
negotiations, the Soviets took the position that such cargo was out of
their control, once purchased, and thus should not be included in
computing the one-third shares. It was clearly understood in 1972
that the grain which had been purchased by Dreyfus was to be included
in the computations. Although there are cases such as oil swaps
which are difficult to account for in advance, the potential for abuse
was too great for the United States to have accepted elimination of
third country pruchases from the computations.
The operating subsidy paid to U.S.-flag bulk carriers was
authorized under the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. 49 The U.S.-flag
vessels carrying grain to the U.S.S.R. were the first to benefit from
this subsidy, wherein they were to receive the excess of their operat-
ing cost over the costs of competing foreign vessels. Unlike liner
vessels, bulk carriers were not eligible for construction subsidies
prior to passage of the 1970 Merchant Marine Act. Thus the shipping
lines were permitted to include an allowance for depreciation and
indebtedness of vessels in calculating their operating costs.50 The
subsidy was designed to create a break-even situation. The 1972
calculation took into consideration a minimum rate of $8.05 per ton,
51
the rate originally negotiated for the grain carriage. At that time
it cost the U.S. lines approximately $19.00 a ton to carry the grain
from the Gulf coast to the Baltic. In order to prevent excess profit-
taking, the Maritime Administration regulations5 2 require that all
53
subsidy contracts contain renegotiation clauses. As the market
rates increase, the subsidy is reduced. No subsidy is paid when the
ships are fixed5 4 to carry cargo at break-even rates or better.
5 5
The amount of the subsidy involved depends on the amount of
grain actually carried in U.S. ships, as well as on the rate at which
it is carried. In 1976, $38.5 million was paid to U.S. ships operating
in the grain trade, out of a total ship subsidy payment of $278
million. The subsidy for 1977 is expected to be $18.3 million less,
primarily due. to a drop in Soviet grain purchases of 5.3 million
tons. 56 Although the Soviets have agreed to ship more of the grain in
U.S. ships, this is offset by the higher rate of $16.47 per long ton
which they have agreed to pay.
Sovereign Immunity-Jurisdiction
Memoranda on Port Procedures in the respective Maritime
Agreements57 state the traditional U.S. and Soviet positions on
sovereign immunity as it relates to possible attachment or detention
of vessels. The U.S. follows the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity which recognizes such immunity with regard to sovereign
public acts, but not with regard to private or commercial acts, includ-
58ing acts by public-owned or operated merchant vessels. The U.S.
provision indicates that attachment of a vessel for jurisdictional
purposes should not be necessary in quasi in rem proceedings if an
agent for service of process has been appointed. To avoid attachment
or minimize the arrest period connected therewith in in rem proceed-
ings, an agent should be appointed to post the necessary bond. The
United States does not recognize the Soviet Union's claim of
sovereign immunity for her commercial vessels. The most recent U.S.
position is that foreign vessels should not be attached unless it
proves necessary to execute on a judgment. In fact, an entire cause
of action may be lost by an improper seizure.
5 9
The Soviet Union follows the absolute sovereign immunity
60
theory, and claims its state-operated merchant ships may not be sub-
ject to attachment or execution without its consent. 61 The Soviet
authorities may exercise jurisdiction over any foreign ships within
the waters of the U.S.S.R., except warships, and only accord sovereign
immunity to vessels which are the property of a foreign state if that
32
state accords immunity to Soviet-owned vessels.62 There are very few
states which do grant such immunity. Thus Soviet detention of foreign
vessels is possible in certain cases. The initial detention order is
valid for seventy-two hours.
6 3
Economic Impact
The Maritime Agreement has given a definite boost to the
sagging U.S. maritime industry, which has been bolstered as well by
the government's payment of operating subsidies to U.S.-flag carriers
when the prevailing rates were deemed to be below the break-even
point. The objective of parity in bilateral controlled liner cargo
carryings under the Agreements appears to have been achieved, after a
halting start.64 U.S.-flag ships have been able to pick up a substan-
65tial amount of foreign-to-foreign and back haul carrage as well.
Although overall the U.S. has not been able to take full advantage of
its opportunity to carry one-third of the U.S.-Soviet trade, due
partially to the unavailability of sufficient U.S. ships to carry the
grain when more profitable oil and P.L.480 wheat cargoes were avail-
able, for example, and due partially to various Soviet contracting
66
practices, the U.S. figures have increased from 17.9 percent of the
grain carriage from July 1, 1972 to December 31, 1973, 67 to 26 percent
in 1976.6 8 The United States insists she is entitled to one-third of
the carriage, not just of the offerings, and thus will no longer
certify unavailability of U.S.-flag ships. To prove her good faith
effort to give the U.S.-flag vessels one-third of the cargo, the
Soviet Union fixed fourteen U.S. ships for April 1977 to carry a
record high cargo of 479,000 metric tons of grain.
U.S.-Soviet Trade Perspective
When it was negotiated in 1972, the Maritime Agreement was an
integral part of a series of far-reaching agreements between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. The hope was for the achievement of a lessening of
tension through greater trade opportunities and interdependence.
Among the other agreements were: The Grains Agreement,69 signed on
July 8, 1972; The Trade Agreement
70 and the Lend Lease Agreement,
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both signed on October 18, 1972. It was anticipated that U.S.-Soviet
trade would at least triple over the next few years.
However, the Lend Lease Settlement and the Trade Agreement were
made conditional on the U.S. granting the Soviet Union most favored
nation (MFN) status, and this status has not yet been granted. The
objection to the granting of MFN status was led by Sen. Henry Jackson.
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act 72 makes granting of
such status, and of essential credits, dependent on a new Soviet policy
of free emigration by Jews from the Soviet Union. The Soviets had been
liberalizing their emigration policy toward the Jews for several years,
but could not accept this attempt to interfere with internal Soviet
policy.
An even greater obstacle to increased U.S.-Soviet trade was the
passage of Export-Import Bank legislation limiting the credit to the
73
Soviet Union to $300 million over four years. This extremely small
amount of credit limits the Soviets' ability to import U.S. technology
and equipment. The U.S. exports to the Soviet Union tend to be
job-intensive, whereas the imports from the U.S.S.R. tend to be
primarily low job-intensive raw materials. This provides potential
job and trade surplus advantages for the U.S. 74 Since the Soviets
need hard currency with which to pay for their imports, credit is
essential to the successful large-scale increase of their trade.
Fortunately, some credit is available from commercial banks, and the
Attorney General has approved deferred-payment sales by private U.S.
firms to the U.S.S.R.
75
Thus, although trade between the Soviet Union and the United
States has greatly expanded since the signing of the agreements in
1972, there are obstacles which must be overcome if the full potential
of those agreements is to be realized. The Maritime Agreement is a
key agreement. While the trade expands, even at a reduced level,
U.S. merchant shipping will be strengthened. It is vitally important,
both from a strategic and a commercial point of view, to have a strong,
healthy maritime industry. In addition, increased trade with the
Soviet Union may broaden economic interdependence and strengthen
political cooperation.
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